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Corporations-Agency-Imputation of Knowledge Where Two
Corporations Have Common Officer or Agent.
A was vice-president and general manager of X corporation and
also secretary and treasurer of Y corporation. The two corpor-
ations occupied the same offices and had virtually the same board of
directors. Y corporation made a loan on land which X corporation,
three years previously, had foreclosed as trustee under a deed of
trust. A knew that X corporation had failed to pay, out of the pro-
ceeds of the foreclosure sale, certain bonds secured by the foreclosed
deed of trust. In an action by the holder of the unpaid bonds, held,
inter aia, that A's knowledge that the bonds had not been paid was
not imputed to Y corporation.1
The general rule is that notice to, or knowledge of,2 a corporate
officer or agent while he is acting in his official capacity or within
the scope of his authority, and in relation to a matter which his
authority comprehends, is imputable to the corporation.8 Knowledge
is attributed to the corporate principal by a rule of substantive law
which renders actual communication immaterial 4 and which has for
to enforce contracts here if such enforcement would work against our own
citizens, and give to foreigners an advantage which the resident citizen has
not."
'Cheeck v. Squires et al., 200 N. C. 661, 158 S. E. 198 (1931). Conceivably
it might have been urged that the two corporations were so nearly identified
that there should have been a disregard of the corporate fiction and that knowl-
edge should have been imputed. See, generally, Ballantine, Separate Entity of
Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (1927) 100 CENT. L. J. 107 or (1925) 14
CALn. L. REv. 12; (1929) 42 HARV. L. Rrv. 1077. But this approach did not
appear in briefs of counsels, nor was it alluded to in the opinion.
"Notice" and "knowledge" are distinguishable, though often treated synon-
omously. See 4 FLETCHER, CYcLoPErA OF CORPORATIONS (1918) §2216. "Ab-
solute notice" and "notice which means knowledge" are discussed in Seaver,
Notice To An Agent (1916) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1.
'Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417, 12 Sup. Ct. 239, 35 L.
ed. 1063 (1892) ; Follette v. U. S. Mutual Accident Ass'n., 110 N. C. 377, 14
S. E. 923 (1892) ; LeDuc v. Moore et al., 111 N. C. 516, 15 S. E. 888 (1892) ;
Short v. LaFayette Life Ins. Co., 194 N. C. 649, 140 S. E. 302 (1927) ; BAL-
LANTiNE, CORPORATIONS (1927) 112; 4 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 2, §2215;
for general agency background, see Note (1925) 10 IowA L. BuL 231.
' 10 IowA L. BULL., supra note 3, at 234, 235. True, any liability resulting
from the imputation of notice attaches to the corporation in its abstract sense,
that is, as a legal entity; but it is erroneous to conceive of imputation as based
on a duty to communicate to the corporation as an impersonal entity. For
since the corporate functions can be realized only through natural persons act-
ing as agents, communication must (except in the case of notice directly to a
stockholders' meeting) be to some duly authorized officers or agents who are,
for the particular transaction, "the corporation." These persons may be those
who acquire the knowledge; or they may be those "higher up" in the corporate
organization to whom the persons who acquire the knowledge are under a duty
to communicate. See RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, TENTATIVE DRAFT 5, §500; 2
MECHEm, AGENCY. (2d ed. 1914) §1843.
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its object the protection of third persons who deal with the cor-
poration.5
There are three well established exceptions to the general rule.
Knowledge is not imputable: (1) where the knowledge consists of
confidential communications which it would be improper for the
agent to disclose ;6 (2) where the officer or agent is acting in his own
or in another's interest and adversely to the corporation ;7 (3) where
the party seeking to have the knowledge imputed colluded with the
officer or agent to defraud the corporation. 8 Many courts recognize
an exception to exception (2): even if the conduct of the officer
or agent is adverse to the interest of the corporation, his knowledge
will be imputed if he is the sole representative of the corporation in
the transaction. 9
There is substantial authority for the rule that knowledge is not
imputable if it be acquired by the officer or agent before the period
of agency or within the period of agency while he was acting in his
private or individual capacity.1 0 But the view which prevails in
England,"1 and that which has been recognized by the Supreme
'MEC aEm, op cit. supra note 4, §1802.
' Sebald v. Citizens Bank, 105 S. W. 130 (Tex. 1907).
TAmerican Nat. Bank of Nashville v. Miller, 229 U. S. 517, 33 Sup. Ct. 883,
57 L. ed 1310 (1913) ; Ohio Millers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Bank, 39 F. (2d)
400 (C. C. A. 5th 1930) (adverse interest relied on inter alia) ; Innerity v.
Bank, 139 Mass. 332, 1 N. E. 282 (1885) ; Corcoran v. Snow Cattle Co., 151
Mass. 74, 23 N. E. 727 (1890); see Bank v. Burgwyn et at., 110 N. C. 267, 275,
276, 14 S. E. 623, 624 (1891); (1925) 19 Iu. L. REV. 595; (1929) 15 VA. L.
Rlv. 782. For a slightly different statement of essentially the same exception,
see (1924) 8 MiNN. L. REv. 452.
8 Western Mortgage & Investment Co. Ltd. v. Ganzer et al., 63 Fed. 647
(C. C. A. 5th, 1894) ; MEcHmE, fuprai note 4, §1826; this exception applies to
corporations; ibid. §1845.
' First Nat. Bank of Blaine v. Blake, 60 Fed. 78 (D. Ore. 1894) ; McFerson
et al. v. Bristol, 73 Colo. 214, 214 Pac. 395 (1923) ; Mays et al. v. First State
Bank of Keller, 247 S. W. 845 (Tex. 1923) ; State Bank of Pamplin v. Payne
et al., 159 S. E. 163 (Va. 1931); 2 FLFTcHER, op. cit. supra note 2, §2251;
(1925) 12 VA. L. REv. 73; (1926) 39 HARV. L. Rav. 645. The North Carolina
court seems to have recognized what was in effect the "sole representative"
rule in Brite v. Penny, 157 N. C. 87, 72 S. E. 964 (1911). Apparently this
doctrine is not squarely accepted by the U. S. Supreme Court. See Curtis,
Collins, and Holbrook v. United States, 262 U. S. 215, 224, 43 Sup. Ct. 570, 573,
67 L. ed. 956, 960 (1923) ; see also Kean et al. v. National City Bank, 294 Fed.
214, 224 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923).
"0Brennan et al. v. Emery-Bird-Thayer Dry-Goods Co., 99 Fed. 971 (W. D.
Mo. 1900); Peoples Bank of Talbotton v. Exchange Bank of Macon, 116 Ga.
820, 43 S. E. 269 (1902) ; Bangor & P. Ry. Co. v. American Bangor Slate Co.
et al., 203 Pa. 6, 52 Atl. 40 (1902) ; Taylor et al. v. Taylor et al., 88 Tex. 47,
29 S. W. 1057 (1895) ; Grayson County Nat. Bank v. Hall, 91 S. W. 807 (Tex.
1906). This rule was recognized as to the agent of a, natural person in War-
rick v. Warrick and Kniveton, 3 Atkyns 219 (1745).'Dresser v. Norwood, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 466 (1864).
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Court of the United States12 as well as by many of the state courts,
is that any knowledge which the agent possesses (i.e., which is actu-
ally present in his mind) while he is acting with regard to the subject
matter of his agency and which is so pertinent to the subject matter
that he owes a duty to communicate it, is imputable to the corpor-
ation, regardless of when such knowledge wa acquired.'3
Where two corporations which deal with each other have a com-
mon officer or agent, the question is presented: is his knowledge
imputable to either or both corporations?
If the officer or agent acts with the consent of both corporations,
and he owes a duty to each to communicate his knowledge, both
principals will be charged with his knowledge. 14 Where there is no
such consent, and the two corporations are adversely interested,
there are two possible situations: (1) if the officer or agent repre-
sents only one of them, his knowledge is obviously imputable to this
one alone ;15 (2) if he occupies a representative position in both, it is
said that there is a conflict of duty on his part, and there is no impu-
tation, the question of knowledge under such circumstances depend-
ing on actual communication. 16 It may be generally stated that
where there is an interlocking officer or agent, his knowledge is not
imputable to either of the corporations unless he acquires or possesses
the knowledge under such circumstances that it becomes his duty to
communicate it.
17
Two reasons (perhaps three' 8) are advanced in support of the
"The Distilled Spirits," 11 Wall. (U. S.) 356, 20 L. ed. 367 (1871).
'Willard v. Denise, 50 N. J. Eq. 482, 26 At. 29 (1893) ; Craigie ct al. v.
Hadley, 99 N. Y. 131, 1 N. E. 537 (1885); Union Bank v. Campbell, 23 Tenn.
(4 Humph.) 394 (1843) ; Tagg v. Tennessee Nat. Bank, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.)
479 (1870); see Red River Land & Investment Co. v. Smith, 7 N. D. 236, 74
N. W. 194, 197 (1898). MECHEM, mspra note 4, §1850.
"'First State Bank of Keota v. Bridges, 39 Okla. 355, 135 Pac. 378 (1913).
"Utah Const. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 174 Cal. 156, 162 Pac. 631
(1917) ; Benton et al. v. German American Nat. Bank, 122 Mo. 332, 26 S. W.
975 (1894); Central Nat. Bank of Springfield v. Pipkin, 66 Mo. App. 592
(1896); Cherry v. First Texas Chemical Mfg. Co. et al., 144 S. W. 306 (Tex.
1912) ; Casco Nat. Bank of Portland v. Clark et al., 139 N. Y. 307, 34 N. E.
908 (1893) ; Wardlaw v. Troy Oil Mill, 74 S. C. 368, 54 S. E. 658 (1906).
'Note (1886) 36 Am. Dec., 188, 193.
'In re Fenwick, Stobart Co., Ltd., (1902) 1 Ch. 507, in which Buckley, 3.,
says: "What the court has to see is WIhether the information he gets, as sec-
retary of one company, comes to him under such circumstances as that it is his
duty to communicate it to the other company." 3 THoMPSON, CORPORATIONS
(3d ed. 1927) §1770.
" Mr. Justice Connor states in the opinion that there was no finding that
A "acted for or represented" Y corporation in the negotiation of the loan, but
does not comment further on this. If A did not represent Y corporation in
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)
holding in the instant case: (1) A did not acquire the knowledge
while acting as an officer of Y corporation; (2) it was to the interest
of X corporation that Y corporation should not know of irregularities
in title to the land; hence, it could not be presumed that A would
communicate the knowledge to Y corporation.
The fact that A did not acquire the knowledge while acting as an
officer of Y corporation would not have been conclusive, in many
jurisdictions, if it had appeared that he had acted for Y corporation
with the knowledge actually in mind;19 but there was no such find-
ing. Furthermore, the sole-representative doctrine is not applicable
to the facts.20 The second reason advanced seems entirely adequate.
That A would communicate his knowledge to Y corporation under
the circumstances is contrary to experience. 21
Wm. ADAMs, JR.
Criminal Law-Effect of Void Sentence.
Plaintiff was indicted on three counts, convicted and sentenced to
one term of one year and one day and to two terms of six months
each; confinement in Leavenworth. A federal statute provided that
no prisoner be sentenced to a penitentiary except the period be for
longer than one year.' After plaintiff had served the first two terms
and two months on the third, he petitioned for a writ of habeas cor-
pus, contending that the sentence under which he was serving was
void in that the court did not have jurisdiction to impose it. Held,
sentences two and three are void. Writ ordered to be issued but with-
out prejudice to the United States to have plaintiff sentenced in ac-
cordance with the law on the verdict against him.
2
the particular transaction, there remains only one possibility of imputation of
knowledge through A to Y corporation; and that is, that A's authority was so
general as to constitute him the alter ego of the corporation in respect to all
its business. The statement of facts would indicate that he had quite general
authority: "The two corporations occupied the same offices and were under the
general control and management of" A. Does the court recognize such gen-
eral authority in A, or instead, does it regard his authority as limited, and
therefore rely on the absence of a finding that he was acting in regard to a
matter over which his authority extended?
See note 13, supra.
Because Y corporation was also represented in the transaction by a loan
committee, which considered the details of the loan. See McFerson et al. v.
Bristol, supra note 9, at 396, in which the court intimates that the sole actor
rule would not have been applicable had there been a discount committee in-
volved, and not only the agent alone.
' 14a C. J. 491, §2359 (2).
'13 Stat. 500 (1865), 18 U. S. C. A. §695 (1927).
'Copeland v. Archer, 50 F. (2d) 836 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
